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CAUSE MODELS WITH DICHOTOMOUS EXPOSURES
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Harvard University and University of Washington
The sufficient-component cause framework assumes the existence
of sets of sufficient causes that bring about an event. For a binary out-
come and an arbitrary number of binary causes any set of potential
outcomes can be replicated by positing a set of sufficient causes; typi-
cally this representation is not unique. A sufficient cause interaction is
said to be present if within all representations there exists a sufficient
cause in which two or more particular causes are all present. A singu-
lar interaction is said to be present if for some subset of individuals
there is a unique minimal sufficient cause. Empirical and counterfac-
tual conditions are given for sufficient cause interactions and singular
interactions between an arbitrary number of causes. Conditions are
given for cases in which none, some or all of a given set of causes
affect the outcome monotonically. The relations between these re-
sults, interactions in linear statistical models and Pearl’s probability
of causation are discussed.
1. Introduction. Rothman’s sufficient-component cause model [25] pos-
tulates a set of different causal mechanisms, each sufficient to bring about the
outcome under consideration. Rothman refers to these hypothesized causal
mechanisms as “sufficient causes,” conceiving of them as minimal sets of
actions, events or states of nature which together initiate a process resulting
in the outcome.
Thus each sufficient cause is hypothesized to consist of a set of “compo-
nent causes.” Whenever all components of a particular sufficient cause are
present, the outcome occurs; within every sufficient cause, each component
would be necessary for that sufficient cause to lead to the outcome. Models
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of this kind have a long history: a simple version is considered by Cayley [4];
it also corresponds to the INUS model introduced by Mackie [14] in the
philosophical literature; see also [3] for an early application. Much recent
work has sought to relate the model to other causal modeling frameworks
[9, 11, 35, 37, 39].
In traditional sufficient-component cause [SCC] models, the outcome and
all the component causes are events, or equivalently, binary random vari-
ables. An SCC model with k component causes implies a set of 2k potential
outcomes. Conversely, in Section 2 we show that for any given list of po-
tential outcomes there is at least one SCC model which represents this set.
However, in general there may be many such SCC models.
One question concerns whether, given a set of potential outcomes implied
by some (unknown) SCC model, one may infer that two component causes
are present within some sufficient cause in the unknown SCC model. In gen-
eral, it is possible that two SCC models both imply the same set of potential
outcomes, yet although A and B occur together in some sufficient component
cause in the first model, A and B are not present together in any sufficient
component cause in the second. In [39] two sufficient component causes are
said to form a “sufficient cause interaction” (or to be “irreducible”) if they
are both present within at least one sufficient cause in every SCC model for
a given set of potential outcomes. Of course, in general, the distribution of
potential outcomes for a given population is also unknown, though it is con-
strained (marginally) by the observed data from a randomized experiment.
In [39] empirical conditions are given which are sufficient to ensure that for
any set of potential outcomes compatible with experimental data, all com-
patible SCC models will contain a sufficient cause involving A and B. These
results were an improvement upon earlier empirical tests for the existence of
a two-way interaction in an SCC model [26], which required the assumption
of monotonicity; see also [1, 12, 13, 17, 38]. The new results are able to es-
tablish the existence of an interaction in situations where monotonicity does
not hold. In this paper we develop empirical conditions that are sufficient for
the existence of a sufficient cause containing a given subset of an arbitrary
number of variables, both with and without monotonicity assumptions.
As illustrative motivation for the theoretical development, we will consider
data presented in a study by [31], summarized in Table 1, from a case-
control study of bladder cancer examining possible three-way interaction
between smoking (1 = present), and genetic variants on NAT2 (0 =R, 1 = S
genotype) and NAT1 (1 for the *10 allele) for Caucasian individuals. We
return to this example at the end of this paper to examine the evidence for
a sufficient cause containing all three: smoking, the S genotype on NAT2
and the *10 allele on NAT1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the sufficient-component cause framework as formalized by VanderWeele
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Table 1
Case-control data from a study of bladder cancer [31]
Cases Controls
Smoking NAT2 NAT1*10 (n = 215) (n = 191) Odds ratio (95% CI)
0 0 0 6 13 1
0 0 1 8 16 1.1 (0.3, 3.9)
0 1 0 16 31 1.1 (0.4, 3.5)
0 1 1 6 10 1.3 (0.3, 5.3)
1 0 0 42 32 2.8 (1.1, 8.3)
1 0 1 41 26 3.4 (1.2, 10.1)
1 1 0 61 51 2.6 (0.9, 7.3)
1 1 1 35 12 6.3 (2.0, 20.3)
and Robins [39]. Section 3 describes general n-way irreducible interactions
(aka “sufficient cause interactions”) and characterizes these in terms of po-
tential outcomes. Section 4 derives empirical conditions for the existence of
irreducible interactions both with and without monotonicity assumptions.
Section 5 describes “singular” interactions which arise in genetic contexts,
provides a characterization, derives empirical conditions that are sufficient
for their existence and relates this notion to Pearl’s probability of causa-
tion. Section 6 discusses the relation between singular and sufficient cause
interactions and linear statistical models. Section 7 provides some comments
regarding stronger interpretations of sufficient cause models, and returns to
the data presented in Table 1. Finally Section 8 offers some possible exten-
sions to the present work.
2. Notation and basic concepts. We will use the following notation: An
event is a binary random variable taking values in {0,1}. We use uppercase
roman to indicate events (X), boldface to indicate sets of events (C), and
lowercase to indicate specific values both for single random variables (X =
x), and, with slight abuse of notation, for sets {C= c} ≡ {∀i, (C)i = (c)i}
and {a≤ b} ≡ {∀i, (a)i ≤ (b)i}; 1 and 0 are vectors of 1’s and 0’s; the
cardinality of a set is denoted |C|. We use fraktur (B) to denote collections
of sets of events.
The complement of some event X is denoted by X ≡ 1−X . A literal event
associated with X , is either X or X . For a given set of events C, L(C) is
the associated set of literal events
L(C)≡C∪ {X |X ∈C}.
For a literal L ∈ L(C), and an assignment c to C, (L)c denotes the value as-
signed to L by c. The conjunction of a set of literal events B= {F1, . . . , Fm} ⊆
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L(C) is defined as
∧
(B)≡
m∏
i=1
Fi =min{F1, . . . , Fm};
note that
∧
(B) = 1 if and only if for all i, Fi = 1. We also define B1 ∧
B2 ≡
∧
{B1,B2}. We will use I(A) to denote the indicator function for event
A. There is a simple correspondence between conjunctions of literals and
indicator functions: let B= {X1, . . . ,Xs} and C= {Y1, . . . , Yt}, then∧
({X1, . . . ,Xs, Y 1, . . . , Y t}) = 1 ⇔ I({B= 1,C= 0}) = 1.(2.1)
Similarly, the set of literals corresponding to an assignment c to C is defined
B
[c] ≡ {L|L ∈ L(C), (L)c = 1}
so that
∧
(B[c]) = I(C= c); note that |B[c]|= |C|. The disjunction of a set
of binary random variables is defined as∨
({Z1, . . . ,Zp})≡max{Z1, . . . ,Zp};
note that
∨
({Z1, . . . ,Zp}) = 1 if and only if for some j, Zj = 1. Simi-
larly we let B1 ∨ B2 ≡
∨
{B1,B2}. Given a collection of sets of literals
B= {C1, . . . ,Cq}, we define∨∧
(B)≡
∨
i
(∧
(Ci)
)
.
We use P˙(L(C)) to denote the set of subsets of L(C) that do not contain
both X and X for any X ∈C; more formally,
P˙(L(C))≡ {B|B⊂ L(C) for all X ∈C,{X,X}*B}.
Note that if B ∈ P˙(L(C)), and |B|= |C|, so that for all C ∈C, exactly one
of C or C is in B, then an assignment of values b to B induces a unique
assignment c to C and vice versa.
2.1. Potential outcomes models. Consider a potential outcome model [27,
28, 30] with s binary factors, X1, . . . ,Xs, which represent hypothetical in-
terventions or causes, and let D denote some binary outcome of interest.
We use Ω to denote the sample space of individuals in the population and
use ω for a particular sample point. Let Dx1,...,xs(ω) denote the counterfac-
tual value of D for individual ω if the cause Xj were set to the value xj
for j = 1, . . . , s. The potential outcomes framework we employ makes two
assumptions: first, that for a given individual these counterfactual variables
are deterministic; second, in asserting that the counterfactual Dx1,...,xs(ω) is
well defined, it is implicitly assumed that the value that D would take on for
individual ω is determined solely by the values that X1, . . . ,Xs are assigned
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Table 2
All potential outcomes and actual outcomes for three binary causes, X1, X2 and X3, in
a population with two individuals
Individual D000 D001 D010 D011 D100 D101 D110 D111 (X1,X2,X3) D
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 (1,0,1) 1
2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 (0,0,0) 0
for this individual, and not the assignments made to these variables for other
individuals ω′. This latter assumption is often called “no interference” [7],
or the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) [29]. An example
of a situation where this assumption might fail is a vaccine trial where there
is “herd” immunity.
We will use Dx1,...,xs(ω), DX1=x1,...,Xs=xs(ω), Dc and DC=c(ω), with C=
{X1, . . . ,Xs} interchangeably. In this setting there will be 2
s potential out-
comes for each individual ω in the population, one potential outcome for each
possible value of (X1, . . . ,Xs); we use D(C;ω) to denote the set of all such
potential outcomes for an individual, and D(C;Ω) for the population. Note
that if G= g(C) is some deterministic function of C, then GC=c(ω) = g(c),
and hence is constant; thus our usage is consistent with the definition of
(L)c in the previous section.
The actual observed value of D for individual ω will be denoted by D(ω)
and similarly the actual value of X1, . . . ,Xs by X1(ω), . . . ,Xs(ω). Actual and
counterfactual outcomes are linked by the consistency axiom which requires
that
DX1=X1(ω),...,Xs=Xs(ω)(ω) =D(ω),(2.2)
that is, that the value of D which would have been observed ifX1, . . . ,Xs had
been set to the values they actually took is equal to the value of D which was
in fact observed [22]. It follows from this axiom that DX1(ω),...,Xs(ω)(ω) =D
is observed, but it is the only potential outcome for individual ω that is
observed.
Example 1. Consider a binary outcome D with three binary causes
of interest, X1, X2 and X3. Suppose that the population consists of two
individuals. The potential outcomes (left-hand side) and actual outcomes
(right-hand side) are shown in Table 2.
We use the notation A ⊥⊥ B|C to indicate that A is independent of B,
conditional on C in the population distribution.
2.2. Definitions for sufficient cause models. The following definitions
generalize those in [39] to sub-populations, ∅ 6=Ω∗ ⊆Ω:
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Definition 2.1 (Sufficient cause). A subset B of the putative (binary)
causes L(C) for D forms a sufficient cause for D (relative to C) in sub-
population Ω∗ if for all c ∈ {0,1}|C| such that (
∧
(B))c = 1, Dc(ω) = 1 for
all ω ∈Ω∗ ⊆Ω. [We require that there exists a c∗ such that (
∧
(B))c∗ = 1.]
Observe that if B is a sufficient cause for D, then any intervention setting
the variables C to c with (
∧
(B))c = 1 will ensure that Dc(ω) = 1 for all
ω ∈Ω∗. We restrict the definition to nonempty sets Ω∗, to preclude every set
B being a sufficient cause in an empty sub-population. Likewise we require
that there exists some c∗ such that (
∧
(B))c∗ = 1 in order to avoid logically
inconsistent conjunctions, for example, X1∧X1, being classified (vacuously)
as a sufficient cause. As a direct consequence, for any binary random variable
X , at most one of X and X appear in any sufficient cause B.
Proposition 2.2. In Ω∗ if B is a sufficient cause for D relative to C,
then B is sufficient for D in any set C∗ with B⊆C∗ ⊆C.
B may be sufficient for D relative to C in Ω∗, but not relative to C′ ⊃C.
Proposition 2.3. If B is a sufficient cause for D relative to C in Ω∗,
then B is sufficient for D relative to C in any subset ∅ 6=Ω∗∗ ⊆Ω∗.
B may be sufficient for D relative to C in Ω∗, but not in Ω′ ⊃Ω∗.
Definition 2.4 (Minimal sufficient cause). A set B ⊂ L(C) forms a
minimal sufficient cause for D (relative to C) in sub-population Ω∗ if B
constitutes a sufficient cause for D in Ω∗, but no proper subset B∗ ⊂B also
forms a sufficient cause for D in Ω∗.
Note that (in some Ω∗) B may be a minimal sufficient cause for D relative
to C, but not relative to C∗ ⊂C, so the analog of Proposition 2.2 does not
hold. For individual 2 in Table 2 {X1,X3} is a minimal sufficient cause
relative to {X1,X2,X3}. However, if we suppose that for ω = 2, X2 is not
caused by X1 and X3, so for all x1, x3, X2X1=x1,X3=x3(ω = 2) =X2(ω = 2),
then {X1,X3} is not a minimal sufficient cause relative to {X1,X3}.
DX1=0,X3=1(ω = 2) =DX1=0,X2=0,X3=1(ω = 2) = 1,
DX1=1,X3=1(ω = 2) =DX1=1,X2=0,X3=1(ω = 2) = 1
[sinceX2(ω = 2) = 0]; henceX3 is a sufficient cause ofD relative to {X1,X3};
hence {X1,X3} is not minimal relative to {X1,X3} for ω = 2.
Similarly, if B is a minimal sufficient cause for D relative to C in Ω∗,
it does not follow that B is a minimal sufficient cause for D relative to
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C in subsets Ω∗∗ ⊆ Ω∗, so the analog to Proposition 2.3 does not hold. In
particular, it may be the case that for all ω ∈Ω∗,B is not a minimal sufficient
cause for D in {ω}.
In the language of digital circuit theory [15], sufficient causes are termed
“implicants,” and minimal sufficient causes are “prime implicants.”
Definition 2.5 (Determinative set of sufficient causes). A set of suffi-
cient causes for D, B= {B1, . . . ,Bn} ⊆ P˙(L(C)), is said to be determinative
for D (relative to C) in sub-population Ω∗ if for all ω ∈ Ω∗ and for all c,
Dc(ω) = 1 if and only if (
∨∧
(B))c = 1.
We will refer to a determinative set of sufficient causes for D as a sufficient
cause model. Observe that in any sub-population Ω∗ for which there exists a
determinative set of sufficient causes, the vectors of potential outcomes for
D are identical, so D(C, ω) =D(C, ω′) for all ω,ω′ ∈Ω∗.
Definition 2.6 (Nonredundant set of sufficient causes). A determina-
tive set of sufficient causes B, for D, is said to be nonredundant (in Ω∗,
relative to C) if there is no proper subset B∗ ⊂B that is also determinative
for D.
Note that sufficient causes are conjunctions, while sets of sufficient causes
form disjunctions of conjunctions; minimality refers to the components in a
particular conjunction, that each component is required for the conjunction
to be sufficient for D; nonredundancy implies that each conjunction is re-
quired for the disjunction of the set of conjunctions to be determinative. If
for some set of sufficient causes B⊆ P˙(L(C)), for all X ∈C, and all B ∈B,
either X ∈B or X ∈B, then B is a nonredundant set of sufficient causes.
Example 1 (Revisited). The set B1 = {{X1,X2},{X2,X3},{X2,X3}}
forms a determinative set of sufficient causes for the individual ω = 2, since
Dc(ω = 2) = ((X1 ∧X2)∨ (X2 ∧X3)∨ (X2 ∧X3))c(2.3)
as does B2 = {{X1,X3},{X2,X3},{X2,X3}}:
Dc(ω = 2) = ((X1 ∧X3)∨ (X2 ∧X3)∨ (X2 ∧X3))c.(2.4)
As this example shows, determinative sets of sufficient causes are not, in
general, unique.
2.3. Sufficient cause representations for a population. As noted, if B is
a sufficient cause for D in Ω∗, then all the units in Ω∗ will have D = 1 for
any assignment c to C, such that (
∧
(B))c = 1. In most realistic settings
it is unlikely that any set B will be sufficient to ensure D = 1 in an entire
population. Consequently, different sets of sufficient causes will be required
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within different sub-populations. A sufficient cause representation is a set of
sub-populations, each with its own determinative sufficient cause represen-
tation.
Definition 2.7. A sufficient cause representation (A,B) for D(C;Ω) is
an ordered set A= 〈A1, . . . ,Ap〉 of binary random variables, with (Ai)c =Ai
for all i,c, and a set B= 〈B1, . . . ,Bp〉, with Bi ∈ P˙(L(C)), such that for all
ω, c, Dc(ω) = 1⇔ for some j,Aj(ω) = 1 and (
∧
(Bj))c = 1.
Note that the binary random variables Ai and the sets Bi are naturally
paired via the orderings of A and B; we will refer to a pair (Ai,Bi) as
occurring in the representation. The requirement that (Ai)c =Ai for all i,c
implies that A ∩C = ∅, and further that the Ai are unaffected by inter-
ventions on the Xi; this is in keeping with the interpretation of the Ai as
defining pre-existing sub-populations with particular sets of potential out-
comes for D.
Proposition 2.8. If (A,B) is a sufficient cause representation for
D(C;Ω), then Bi is a sufficient cause of D in the sub-population in which
Ai(ω) = 1.
Proposition 2.9. If (A,B) is a sufficient cause representation for
D(C;Ω), then for all A∗ ⊆A, if
∅ 6=ΩA
∗
A\A∗ ≡ {ω| for all Ai ∈A,Ai(ω) = 1 iff Ai ∈A
∗},
then
B
A
∗
≡ {Bi|Bi ∈B;Ai ∈A
∗}
forms a determinative set of sufficient causes (relative to C) for ΩA
∗
A\A∗ .
Note that ΩA
∗
A\A∗ consists of the sub-population in which Ai(ω) = 1 for
all Ai ∈A
∗ and Aj(ω) = 0 for all Aj ∈A \A
∗.
Proof. Suppose for some ω ∈ ΩA
∗
A\A∗ , Bj ∈ B
A∗ , and c we have
(
∧
(Bj))c = 1. Since ω ∈ Ω
A∗
A\A∗ , Aj(ω) = 1. It then follows from the defi-
nition of a sufficient cause representation that Dc(ω) = 1. Conversely, sup-
pose Dc(ω) = 1. As (A,B) is a sufficient cause representation, for some j,
Aj(ω) = 1 and (
∧
(Bj))c = 1. Since, by hypothesis, ω ∈ Ω
A∗
A\A∗ , it follows
that Aj ∈A
∗, hence Bj ∈B
A∗ . 
Theorem 2.10. For any D(C;Ω), there exists a sufficient cause repre-
sentation (A,B).
Proof. Let p = 2|C|, and define B ≡ {B|B ⊆ P˙(L(C)), |B| = |C|} ≡
〈B1, . . . ,Bp〉, ordered arbitrarily. Further define Ai(ω) ≡ DBi=1(ω). Given
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an arbitrary c, for some j, B[c] =Bj , by construction of B. We then have
Dc(ω) = 1 ⇔ DBj=1(ω) = 1 ⇔ Aj(ω) = 1 and
(∧
(Bj)
)
c
= 1
as required. The last step follows since by definition B[c] = 1 if and only if
C= c. 
[39] prove this for the case of |C|= 2; see also [9] and [35] for discussion
of the case |C|= 1.
Example 1 (Revisited). The construction given in the proof of The-
orem 2.10 would yield the following sets of sufficient causes to represent
D(C;Ω) shown in Table 2:
B= 〈B1, . . . ,B8〉
= 〈{X1,X2,X3},{X1,X2,X3},{X1,X2,X3},{X1,X2,X3},(2.5)
{X1,X2,X3},{X1,X2,X3},{X1,X2,X3},{X1,X2,X3}〉
with A1 = I({ω = 2}),A4 =A5 =A8 = 0,A2 =A3 =A6 =A7 = 1.
3. Irreducible conjunctions. We saw in Example 1 above with ω = 2
that an individual’s potential outcomes may be such that there are two
determinative sets of common causesB andB′ and {X1,X2} is inB, but not
in B′. However, certain conjunctions are such that in every representation
either the conjunction is present or it is contained in some larger conjunction;
such conjunctions are said to be “irreducible.”
Definition 3.1. B ∈ P˙(L(C)) is said to be irreducible for D(C,Ω) if in
every representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω), there exists Bi ∈B, with B⊆Bi.
[39] also refer to irreducibility of B for D(C,Ω) as a “sufficient cause
interaction” between the components of B. (Note, however, that if B is irre-
ducible, this does not, in general, imply that B is either a minimal sufficient
cause, or even a sufficient cause, only that there is a sufficient cause that
contains B.) It can be shown (via Theorem 3.2 below) that {X2,X3} and
{X2,X3} are irreducible for D(C;Ω) in Table 2. In Section 7 we provide
an interpretation of irreducibility in terms of the existence of a mechanism
involving the variables in B. Using C1 ∪˙C2 to indicate the disjoint union of
C1 and C2, we now characterize irreducibility:
Theorem 3.2. Let C = C1 ∪˙C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B| = |C1|.
Then B is irreducible for D(C,Ω) if and only if there exists ω∗ ∈ Ω and
values c∗2 for C2 such that: (i) DB=1,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1; (ii) for all L ∈ B,
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 0.
10 T. J. VANDERWEELE AND T. S. RICHARDSON
Thus B is irreducible if and only if there exists an individual in Ω who
would have response D = 1 if every literal in B is set to 1, but D = 0
whenever one literal is set to 0 and the rest to 1 (in some context C2 = c
∗
2).
Note that conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent to
DB=1,C2=c∗2(ω
∗)−
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c∗2(ω
∗)> 0.(3.1)
Proof. (⇒) We adapt the proof of Theorem 2.10 to show that if for all
ω ∈Ω and assignments c∗2 to C2, at least one of (i) or (ii) does not hold, then
there exists a representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω) such that for all Bi ∈B,
B*Bi. Define
B
† ≡ 〈B†i 〉 ≡ {B
∗|B∗ ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B∗|= |C|,B*B∗},
B
‡ ≡ 〈B‡i 〉 ≡ {B
∗|B∗ ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B∗|= |C| − 1,B \B∗ = {L},L ∈B},
under arbitrary orderings. ThusB† is the set of subsets of exactly |C| literals
that do not include B as a subset, while B‡ contains those subsets of size
|C| − 1 that contain all but one literals in B.
For B†i ∈B
† define the corresponding A†i (ω)≡DB†i=1
(ω);
For B‡i ∈ B
‡ define A‡i (ω) ≡ DB‡i=1,Li=0
(ω)D
B
‡
i=1,Li=1
(ω), where
{Li} ≡B \B
‡
i .
The representation is given by (A,B)≡ (A† ∪A‡,B† ∪B‡), where A† ≡
〈A†i 〉, A
‡ ≡ 〈A‡i 〉. To see this, first note that if for some ω and c, there
is a pair (Aj ,Bj) in (A,B) such that Aj(ω) = 1 and (
∧
(Bj))c = 1. Then
by construction of A† and A‡ it follows that Dc(ω) = 1. For the converse,
suppose that for some c and ω, Dc(ω) = 1. There are two cases to consider:
(
∧
(B))c = 0. In this caseB*B[c], so for some j,B
†
j =B
[c], hence A†j(ω)≡
D
B
†
j=1
(ω) =Dc(ω) = 1, as required.
(
∧
(B))c = 1. Let c be partitioned as (c1,c2). Since (i) holds with c
∗
2 = c2,
(ii) does not. Thus for some L ∈B, DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω) = 1. By construc-
tion of B‡, for some j, B‡j =B
[c] \ {L}, so (
∧
(B‡j))c = 1. Since 1 =Dc(ω) =
DB\{L}=1,L=1,C2=c2(ω), we have A
‡
j(ω) = 1, as required.
(⇐) Suppose for a contradiction, that for some ω∗ and c∗2, (i) and (ii)
hold, but B is not irreducible. Then there exists a representation (A,B)
such that for all Bi ∈B, B* Bi. By (i), DB=1,c∗2(ω
∗) = 1. Thus for some
pair (Aj ,Bj), Aj(ω
∗) = 1 andBj ⊆B∪B
[c∗2]. SinceB*Bj there exists some
L ∈B \Bj , but then since Aj(ω
∗) = 1 and (
∧
(Bj))B\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c∗2 = 1,
we have DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1, which is a contradiction. 
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Corollary 3.3. If B is irreducible for D(C,Ω), then for any Ω∗ ⊃Ω,
B is irreducible for D(C,Ω∗).
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, since if Ω satisfies (i) and (ii), then so does Ω∗.

3.1. B irreducible for D(C,Ω) with |B|= |C|. In the special case where
|B| = |C|, the concepts of minimal sufficient cause for some ω∗ and irre-
ducibility coincide.
Proposition 3.4. If B ∈ P˙(L(C)) and |B|= |C|, then B is a minimal
sufficient cause for some ω∗ ∈Ω relative to C if and only if B is irreducible
for D(C,Ω).
Proof. If |B|= |C|, then condition (i) in Theorem 3.2 (taking C2 =∅)
holds if and only ifB is a sufficient cause forD for ω∗, and similarly condition
(ii) holds if and only if B is a minimal sufficient cause for D (for ω∗). 
Thus we have the following:
Corollary 3.5. If B ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B| = |C| and B is a minimal suf-
ficient cause for D for some ω∗ ∈ Ω, then B ∈B for every representation
(A,B) for D(C,Ω).
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3.4. 
3.2. B irreducible for D(C,Ω) with |B|< |C|. When |B|< |C|, the con-
ditions for irreducibility and for being a minimal sufficient cause are logically
distinct. Condition (i) in Theorem 3.2 requires DB=1,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1 for one
assignment c∗2 (and some ω
∗), while if B is a sufficient cause (for ω∗), then
this condition is required to hold for all assignments c∗2; in contrast condition
(ii) in Theorem 3.2 requires that there exists a single c∗2 (and some ω
∗) such
that for all L ∈B, DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 0, while for B to be a minimal
sufficient cause for ω∗ merely requires that for all L ∈ B, there exists an
assignment cL2 such that DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=cL2
(ω∗) = 0.
Example 1 (Revisited). Let C= {X1,X2,X3}, Ω = {2}. Relative to C,
{X1,X2} is a minimal sufficient cause for ω = 2 since D111(2) =D110(2) = 1,
and D011(2) =D100(2) = 0. However {X1,X2} is not irreducible for D(C,Ω)
because we have D101(2) =D010(2) = 1, hence condition (ii) in Theorem 3.2
is not satisfied for either X3 = 0, or X3 = 1. Conversely {X1} is irreducible
for Ω = {2} since D111(2) = 1, while D011(2) = 0, but {X1} is not a sufficient
cause because D100(2) = 0.
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Though irreducibility of B for D(C,Ω) neither implies, nor is implied by
B being a minimal sufficient cause for some ω ∈Ω, it does imply that every
sufficient cause representation for D(C,Ω) contains at least one conjunction
Bj of which B is a (possibly proper) subset. However, prima facie this still
leaves open the possibility that, for example, every representation either
includes B ∪ {L} or B ∪ {L}, for some L, but no representation includes
both. However, this cannot occur:
Corollary 3.6. Let C = C1 ∪˙C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), if B is irreducible
for D(C,Ω) then there exists a set B∗ ∈ P˙(L(C)), with |B∗|= |C| such that
in every representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω) there exists Bj ∈B, with B⊆
Bj ⊆B
∗.
Thus irreducibility of B further implies that there is a set B∗ of size |C|
such that in every representation there is at least one conjunct containing B
that is itself contained in B∗. However, it should be noted that, in general,
there may be more than one conjunct Bj with B⊆Bj ⊆B
∗.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.2, taking B∗ =B∪B[c
∗
2]. 
Finally, we note that a conjunction that is both irreducible and a mini-
mal sufficient cause corresponds to an “essential prime implicant” in digital
circuit theory [15]. The Quine–McCluskey algorithm [16, 20, 21] finds the
set of essential prime implicants for a given Boolean function, which here
corresponds to the potential outcomes D(C, ω) for an individual.
3.3. Enlarging the set of potential causes. As noted in Section 2.2 a set B
may be a minimal sufficient cause for C but not a superset C′. Irreducibility
is also not preserved without further conditions. To state these conditions
that preserve irreducibility we require the following:
Definition 3.7. X ′ is said to be not causally influenced by a set C if
for all ω ∈Ω, the potential outcomes X ′
C=c(ω) are constant as c varies.
We will also assume that if every X ′ ∈C′ is not causally influenced by C,
then the following relativized consistency axiom holds:
DC=c,C′=C′(ω)(ω) =DC=c(ω),(3.2)
that is, that if variables in C′ are not causally influenced by the variables in
C, then the counterfactual value of D intervening to set C to c is the same
as the counterfactual value of D intervening to set C to c and the variables
in C′ to the values they actually took on.
We now have the following corollary to Theorem 3.2:
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Corollary 3.8. Let C =C1 ∪˙C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B| = |C1|. If B is
irreducible for D(C,Ω), C′ ∩C=∅ and for all X ′ ∈C′, X ′ is not causally
influenced by C, then B is irreducible for D(C∪C′,Ω).
Proof. By Theorem 3.2 there exists ω∗ ∈ Ω and an assignment c∗2 to
C2 such that (i) and (ii) hold. Let c
′ =C′(ω∗). Since variables in C′ are not
causally influenced by C, for all assignments b,
DB=b,C2=c∗2,C′=c′(ω
∗) =DB=b,C2=c∗2,C′=C′(ω∗)(ω
∗) =DB=b,C2=c∗2(ω
∗);
the second equality here follows from (3.2). It follows that ω∗ and (c∗2,c
′)
obey (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.2 with respect to C∪C′. 
The assumption that every variable in C′ is not causally influenced by C,
is required because otherwise we may have C′(ω∗) 6= (C′)B=b∗(ω
∗) for some
assignment b∗ to B. For example, let C= {X1,X2,X3}, and suppose that
DX1=x1,X2=x2,X3=x3(ω) = x3,
(X3)X1=x1,X2=x2(ω) = x1 ∧ x2
for all ω ∈ Ω. In this case {X1,X2} is irreducible for D({X1,X2},Ω), but
not for D({X1,X2,X3},Ω). We saw earlier that if B is a minimal sufficient
cause for C, then this does not imply that B is a minimal sufficient cause
with respect to subsets of C. Here we see that if B is irreducible with respect
for D(C,Ω), then this does not imply irreducibility for supersets C∗ ⊃C,
unless every variable in C∗ \C is not causally influenced by a variable in C.
4. Tests for irreducibility. In this section we derive empirical conditions
which imply that a given conjunction B is irreducible for D(C,Ω). Our first
approach is via condition (3.1).
4.1. Adjusting for measured confounders. To detect that (3.1) holds re-
quires us to identify the mean of potential outcomes in certain subpopula-
tions. This is only possible if we have no unmeasured confounders [22, 24]:
Definition 4.1. A set of covariates W suffices to adjust for confounding
of (the effect of) C on D if
DC=c ⊥⊥C|W=w(4.1)
for all c, w.
Proposition 4.2. If a set W suffices to adjust for confounding of C
on D and P (C= c,W=w)> 0, then
E[DC=c|W=w] =E[D|C= c,W=w].
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The proof of this is standard and hence omitted.
Note that if W is sufficient to adjust for confounding of C on D, then W
is also sufficient to adjust for confounding of B on D, where B ∈ P˙(L(C)),
|B|= |C|.
4.2. Tests for irreducibility without monotonicity.
Theorem 4.3. Let C = C1 ∪˙C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B| = |C1|. If W is
sufficient to adjust for confounding of C on D, and for some c2, w,
0<E[D|B= 1,C2 = c2,W=w],
(4.2)
−
∑
L∈B
E[D|B \ {L}= 1,L= 0,C2 = c2,W=w],
then B is irreducible for D(C,Ω).
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that B is not irreducible
for D(C,Ω). Then by Theorem 3.2, for all ω ∈Ω, and all c2,
DB=1,C2=c2(ω)−
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω)≤ 0.
Hence for any w,
E
[
DB=1,C2=c2 −
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2
∣∣∣W=w]≤ 0.
Applying Proposition 4.2 to each term implies the negation of (4.2). 
The condition provided in Theorem 4.3 can be empirically tested with t-
test type statistics if W consists of a small number of categorical or binary
variables or using regression or inverse probability of treatment weighting
methods [23, 41–43], otherwise.
It follows from Corollary 3.8 that condition (4.2) further establishes that
B is irreducible for D(C ∪ C′,Ω) so long as every variable in C′ is not
causally influenced by variables in C.
It may be shown that condition (4.2) is the sole restriction on the law of
(D,C,W) implied by the negation of irreducibility.
4.3. Graphs. In the next section we develop more powerful tests under
monotonicity assumptions. However, to state these conditions we first intro-
duce some concepts from graph theory:
Definition 4.4. A graph G defined on a set B is a collection of pairs
of elements in B, G≡ {E|E= {B1,B2} ⊆B,B1 6=B2}.
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This is the usual definition of a graph, except that the vertex set here is
a set of literals. We will refer to sets in G as edges, which we will represent
pictorially as B1 B2.
Definition 4.5. Two elements L,L∗ ∈B are said to be connected in G
if there exists a sequence L= L1, . . . ,Lp = L
∗ of distinct elements in B such
that {Li,Li+1} ∈G for i= 1, . . . , p− 1.
The sequence of edges joining L and L∗ is said to form a path in G.
Definition 4.6. A graph G on B is said to form a tree if |G|= |B| − 1,
and any pair of distinct elements in B are connected in G.
In a tree there is a unique path between any two elements.
Proposition 4.7. Let T be a tree on B. For each element R ∈B there
is a natural bijection
φTR :B \ {R}↔ T
given by φTR(L) =E= {L
′,L} where E ∈ T is the last edge on a path from R
to L.
It is not hard to show that for a graph G, if the bijections described in
Proposition 4.7 exist, then G is a tree.
Theorem 4.8 (Cayley [5]). On a set B there are |B||B|−2 different trees.
4.4. Monotonicity. Sometimes it may be known that a certain cause has
an effect on an outcome that is either always positive or always negative.
Definition 4.9. Bi has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to a
set B (with Bi ∈B) in a population Ω if for all ω ∈Ω and all values b−i for
the variables in B \ {Bi}, DB\{Bi}=b−i,Bi=1(ω)≥DB\{Bi}=b−i,Bi=0(ω).
Similarly we say that L has a negative monotonic effect relative to B∪{L}
if L has a positive monotonic effect relative to B∪ {L}. Note that the case
in which DB\{Bi}=b−i,Bi=1(ω) = DB\{Bi}=b−i,Bi=0(ω) for all ω, and hence
Bi has no effect on D relative to B, is included as a degenerate case.
The definition of a positive monotonic effect requires that an intervention
does not decrease D for every individual, not simply on average, regardless
of the other interventions taken. This is thus a strong assumption; see [40]
for further discussion.
Monotonic Boolean functions have been studied in other contexts:
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Proposition 4.10. If for all Ci ∈ C, Ci has a (positive or negative)
monotonic effect on D relative to C, and k = |C|, then the number of distinct
sets of potential outcomes in D(C,Ω) is given by the kth Dedekind number
(Dedekind [8], Wiedemann [44]).
4.5. Tests for irreducibility with monotonicity. Knowledge of the mono-
tonicity of certain potential causes allows for the construction of more pow-
erful statistical tests for irreducibility than those given by Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.11. Let C = C1 ∪˙C2, B = (B+ ∪˙B
′) ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B| =
|C1| and suppose that every L ∈B+ has a positive monotonic effect on D
relative to C. If for some tree T on B+, ω
∗ ∈Ω and some c2, we have
0<DB=1,C2=c2(ω
∗),
(4.3)
−
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω
∗) +
∑
E∈T
DB\E=1,E=0,C2=c2(ω
∗),
then B is irreducible for D(C,Ω).
If we know that X has a negative monotonic effect on D, then we may
use this theorem to construct more powerful tests of the irreducibility of
sets containing X with respect to D(C,Ω). Under the assumption that ev-
ery L ∈C has a monotonic effect on D, we have shown via direct calculation
using cddlib [10] that for |C| ≤ 4, the conditions in (4.3) are the sole re-
strictions on the law of (D,C,W) implied by the negation of irreducibility.
We conjecture that this holds in general.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2 it is sufficient to prove that under the mono-
tonicity assumption on B+, (4.3) implies (3.1). Suppose that (3.1) does not
hold, so that for all values c2, and all ω
∗ ∈Ω,
DB=1,C2=c2(ω
∗)−
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω
∗)≤ 0.
Then for each ω∗ ∈Ω, there exists R ∈B+ such that
DB=1,C2=c2(ω
∗)−
∑
L∈B′∪{R}
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω
∗)≤ 0.
For a given tree T, the remaining terms on the right-hand side of (4.3) are
−
∑
L∈B+\{R}
DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω
∗) +
∑
E∈T
DB\E=1,E=0,C2=c2(ω
∗)
=
∑
L∈B+\{R}
(D
B\φT
R
(L)=1,φT
R
(L)=0,C2=c2
(ω∗)−DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=c2(ω
∗)),
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Fig. 1. The three trees on {X1,X2,X3}.
by Proposition 4.7. Finally since φTR(L) = {L,L
′} ⊆ B+, L
′ has a positive
monotonic effect on D relative to C, thus no term in the sum is positive.
Consequently for all ω∗ ∈Ω, (4.3) does not hold for any tree T. 
Example 2. In the case B= {X1,X2}=B+ =C, there is only one tree
on B+, consisting of a single edge X1 X2. Thus if X1 and X2 have a
positive monotonic effect on D (relative to C) then Theorem 4.11 implies
that if the following inequality holds for some ω ∈Ω,
D11(ω)− (D10(ω) +D01(ω)) +D00(ω)> 0,
then {X1,X2} is irreducible for D(C,Ω).
Example 3. If B= {X1,X2,X3}=B+ =C, then there are three trees
on B+; see Figure 1. These correspond to the following conditions:
(a) D111(ω)− (D110(ω) +D101(ω) +D011(ω)) + (D010(ω) +D001(ω))> 0,
(b) D111(ω)− (D110(ω) +D101(ω) +D011(ω)) + (D100(ω) +D001(ω))> 0,
(c) D111(ω)− (D110(ω) +D101(ω) +D011(ω)) + (D100(ω) +D010(ω))> 0.
Thus B is irreducible for D(C,Ω) if at least one holds for some ω ∈Ω.
Corollary 4.12. Let C=C1 ∪˙C2, B= (B+ ∪˙B
′) ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B|=
|C1|. Suppose that every L ∈B+ has a positive monotonic effect on D rela-
tive to C, and W is sufficient to adjust for confounding of C on D. If for
some tree T on B+, and some c2, w we have
0<E[D|B= 1,C2 = c2,W=w]
−
∑
L∈B
E[D|B \ {L}= 1,L= 0,C2 = c2,W=w](4.4)
+
∑
E∈T
E[D|B \E= 1,E= 0,C2 = c2,W=w],
then B is irreducible for D(C,Ω).
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Proof. Directly analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
The special case of the previous Corollary where |B+| = |C| = 2, and
W = ∅, appears in Rothman and Greenland [26]; see also Koopman [13].
Theorem 4.8 implies that if every literal in B has a positive monotonic effect
on D, then we will have |B||B|−2 conditions to test, each of which is sufficient
to establish the irreducibility of B for D(C,Ω). As before, the conditions
(4.4) may be tested via t-test type statistics or using various statistical
models.
As with the results in Section 4.2, we may apply Corollary 3.8 to establish
that B is irreducible for D(C∪C′,Ω) if every variable in C′ is not causally
influenced by variables in C.
4.6. Tests for a minimal sufficient cause under monotonicity. As noted
in Section 3.1 if |B| = |C|, then irreducible conjunctions are also minimal
sufficient causes. Thus in this special case, the tests of irreducibility given in
Theorem 4.3 and Corollary 4.12 also establish that B is a minimal sufficient
cause relative to C. When |B|< |C| these tests do not in general establish
this. However, under positive monotonicity assumptions on C2, such tests
may be obtained by taking c2 = 0:
Proposition 4.13. Let C =C1 ∪˙C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B| = |C1|. Sup-
pose every L ∈C2 has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to C. If (i)
DB=1,C2=0(ω
∗) = 1 and (ii) for all L ∈B, DB\{L}=1,L=0,C2=0(ω
∗) = 0, then
B is a minimal sufficient cause for D relative to C for ω∗.
Proof. For any c2,DB=1,C2=c2(ω
∗)≥DB=1,C2=0(ω
∗) = 1 by the mono-
tonicity assumption. Hence B is a sufficient cause for D relative to C for
ω∗. Minimality follows directly from condition (ii). 
We have the following corollaries which provide conditions under which B
is a minimal sufficient cause for D relative to C for some ω ∈Ω, in addition
to being irreducible for D(C,Ω):
Corollary 4.14. Let C=C1 ∪˙C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B|= |C1|. Suppose
every L ∈C2 has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to C, and W is
sufficient to adjust for confounding of C on D. If (4.2) holds with c2 = 0 for
some w, then B is a minimal sufficient cause of D relative to C for some
ω ∈Ω.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 4.13 and The-
orem 4.3. 
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Corollary 4.15. Let C=C1 ∪˙C2, B= (B+ ∪˙B
′) ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B|=
|C1|. Suppose that every L ∈B+ ∪C2 has a positive monotonic effect on D
relative to C, and W is sufficient to adjust for confounding of C on D. If
(4.4) holds with c2 = 0 for some w and some tree T on B+, then B is a
minimal sufficient cause of D relative to C for some ω ∈Ω.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 4.13 and Corol-
lary 4.12. 
5. Singular interactions. In the genetics literature, in the context of two
binary genetic factors, X1 and X2, “compositional” epistasis [2, 6, 19] is
said to be present if for some ω∗, D11(ω
∗) = 1 but D10(ω
∗) = D01(ω
∗) =
D00(ω
∗) = 0; in this case the effect of one genetic factor is effectively masked
when the other genetic factor is absent. If {X1,X2} is a minimal sufficient
cause ofD relative to {X1,X2} for ω
∗ then although this impliesD11(ω
∗) = 1
and D10(ω
∗) =D01(ω
∗) = 0, it does not imply D00(ω
∗) = 0. This motivates
the following:
Definition 5.1. A minimal sufficient cause B for D relative to C for ω∗
is said to be singular if there is no B′ ∈ P˙(L(C)), B′ 6=B, forming a minimal
sufficient cause for D relative to C for ω∗. B is singular for D(C,Ω) if B is
singular relative to C for some ω∗ ∈Ω.
IfB is singular for D(C,Ω), then we will also refer to a singular interaction
between the components of B. We now characterize singularity in terms of
potential outcomes:
Theorem 5.2. Let C=C1 ∪C2, B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B|= |C1|. Then B is
singular for D(C,Ω) if and only if there exists ω∗ ∈Ω such that
for all values c∗2,b : DB=b,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1 ⇐⇒ b= 1.(5.1)
Note that (5.1) is equivalent to
DC=c(ω
∗) =
(∧
(B)
)
c
for all c.(5.2)
Thus if B is singular for D(C,Ω), then there is some individual ω∗ whose
potential outcomes are given by the single conjunction B.
Proof. By definition, B is a sufficient cause for D for ω∗ if and only if
(b= 1 ⇒ DB=b,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1). Thus it is sufficient to show that, assuming
B is a minimal sufficient cause for D for ω∗, there are no other minimal
sufficient causes of D for ω∗ if and only if (DB=b,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1 ⇒ b= 1).
Suppose B is the only minimal sufficient cause for D for ω∗, but that
for some b∗ 6= 1, DB=b∗,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1. Let B† ≡B[B=b
∗,C2=c∗2]. B† forms a
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sufficient cause for D for ω∗, and B*B†. Hence there is some B′ ⊆B† that
is a minimal sufficient cause for D for ω∗, and B 6=B†, a contradiction.
Conversely suppose (DB=b,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1 ⇒ b= 1) but there exists an-
other minimal sufficient cause B′ for D for ω∗, and B 6= B†. Since B′ is
minimal, B *B′. Thus there exists a c˜ such that (B)c˜ 6= 1, but (B′)c˜ = 1
and hence DC=c˜(ω
∗) = 1, a contradiction. 
Corollary 5.3. For D(C,Ω), if B is singular then B is irreducible.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from (5.1) and the definition of
irreducibility. 
Theorem 5.4 relates singular interactions to properties of the set of suffi-
cient cause representations for D(C,Ω).
Theorem 5.4. Let B ∈ P˙(L(C)). B is singular for D(C,Ω) if and only
if there exists ω∗ ∈Ω such that in every representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω),
(i) for all B∗ ∈ P˙(L(C)), with |B∗| = |C| and B ⊆ B∗ there exists Bi ∈
B with Bi ⊆ B
∗ and Ai(ω
∗) = 1; (ii) for all Bi ∈ B such that B * Bi,
Ai(ω
∗) = 0.
Proof. Let C=C1 ∪˙C2, where B ∈ P˙(L(C1)), and |B|= |C1|.
(⇒) SupposeB is singular for D(C,Ω), so that some ω∗ ∈Ω satisfies (5.2).
Then for any representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω) and any B∗ such that
|B∗|= |C| and B⊆B∗, we can select values c∗2 so that B
∗ =B[B=1,C2=c
∗
2].
Since DB=1,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1 there exists Ai ∈A, Bi ∈B with Ai(ω
∗) = 1 and
(
∧
(Bi))B=1,C2=c∗2 = 1. Thus Bi ⊆B
∗, so (i) holds. For all Bi ∈B such that
B*Bi, we can choose B˜ ∈ P˙(L(C1)), |B˜|= |C1| with B˜ 6=B and values c˜2
so that Bi ⊆ B
[B˜=1,C2=c˜2]. Since D
B˜=1,C2=c˜2
(ω∗) = 0 we have Ai(ω
∗) = 0
since (
∧
(Bi))B˜=1,C2=c˜2 = 1, so (ii) holds as required.
(⇐) Suppose there exists ω∗ ∈ Ω such that every representation (A,B)
satisfies (i) and (ii). We will show that (5.1) holds. For any values c∗2 let B
∗ ≡
B
[B=1,C2=c∗2], so |B∗| = |C| and B ⊆ B∗. Thus by (i) there exists Bi ∈B
with Bi ⊆B
∗ and Ai(ω
∗) = 1. Hence DB=1,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 1 since Ai(ω
∗) = 1
and (
∧
(Bi))B=1,C2=c∗2 = 1. Conversely for any b
′ 6= 1, let B′ ≡B[B=b
′], so
|B′|= |C1| with B
′ 6=B. Thus for all Bi ∈B such that (
∧
(Bi))B′=1,C2=c∗2 =
1, B*Bi and thus by (ii) Ai(ω∗) = 0. Hence DB′=1,C2=c∗2(ω
∗) = 0. 
We now consider results relevant for testing for singular interactions with
or without monotonicity assumptions.
Theorem 5.5. Let B=B+ ∪˙B
′ ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B|= |C| and suppose that
every L ∈B+ has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to C. If for some
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tree T on B+ and some ω
∗ ∈Ω, we have
DB=1(ω
∗)−
∑
L∈B+
DB\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗)
(5.3)
−
∑
B˜ :∅ 6=B˜⊆B′
D
B\B˜=1,B˜=0
(ω∗) +
∑
E∈T
DB\E=1,E=0(ω
∗)> 0,
then B is singular for D(C,Ω).
Proof. By Theorem 5.4, B is singular for D(C,Ω) if and only if
for some ω∗ ∈Ω, DB=1(ω
∗)−
∑
B˜⊆B
D
B\B˜=1,B˜=0
(ω∗)> 0.(5.4)
Suppose for a contradiction that (5.4) does not hold but (5.3) holds for
some ω∗ ∈ Ω. Since B+ has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to
C, if B˜ ⊆ B is such that B˜ ∩B+ 6= ∅, then DB\B˜=1,B˜=0(ω
∗) = 1 implies
DB\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗) = 1 for some L ∈ B˜. Hence for all ω ∈Ω,
DB=1(ω)−
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0(ω)−
∑
B˜⊆B′,|B˜|≥2
D
B\B˜=1,B˜=0
(ω)≤ 0.(5.5)
By applying the same argument to the first two terms on the left-hand side
of (5.5) as was applied in the proof of Theorem 4.11, we have that (5.3) does
not hold for all ω ∈Ω, which is a contradiction. 
The following corollary to Theorem 5.5 generalizes the discussion in [32,
33] to an arbitrary number of dichotomous factors:
Corollary 5.6. Let B= B+ ∪˙B
′ ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B| = |C|. Suppose that
every L ∈B+ has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to B, and W is
sufficient to adjust for confounding of C on D. If for some tree T on B+,
and some w, we have
0<E[D|B= 1,W=w]−
∑
L∈B+
E[D|B \ {L}= 1,L= 0,W=w]
−
∑
B˜ :∅ 6=B˜⊆B′
E[D|B \ B˜= 1, B˜= 0,W=w](5.6)
+
∑
E∈T
E[D|B \E= 1,E= 0,W=w],
then B is singular for D(C,Ω).
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Proof. By applying Proposition 4.2 to each term in (5.3), the proof is
complete. 
Condition (5.6) leads directly to a statistical test of compositional epis-
tasis. This is notable since some claims in the genetics literature appear to
suggest that such tests did not exist [6].
As stated in the next corollary, from Theorem 5.5, if all or all but one
of the elements of B have positive monotonic effects on D, then singularity
and irreducibility coincide:
Corollary 5.7. Suppose |B| = |C| and that for all or all but one of
Bi ∈B, Bi has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to B, then B is
singular for D(C,Ω) if and only if B is irreducible for D(C,Ω).
An important consequence of this corollary is that when there is at most
one variable that does not have a positive monotonic effect, condition (4.4)
establishes that B is singular in addition to being irreducible for D(C,Ω).
Proof. Let B′ denote the one or zero elements of B that do not have
a monotonic effect on D relative to C. If B is irreducible for D(C,Ω), then
by the argument in the proof of Theorem 4.11,
DB=1(ω
∗)−
∑
L∈B
DB\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗) +
∑
E∈T
DB\E=1,E=0(ω
∗)> 0.
Since the third term on the left-hand side of (5.3) vanishes when |B′| ≤ 1, it
follows that B is singular for D(C,Ω). The converse is given in Corollary 5.3.

Corollary 5.8. Suppose |B| = |C| and that for all or all but one of
Bi ∈ B ∪˙C
′, Bi has a positive monotonic effect on D relative to B ∪C
′,
for all X ′ ∈ C′, X ′ is not causally influenced by C and B is singular for
D(C,Ω), then B is singular for D(C∪C′,Ω).
Proof. By Corollary 5.7, B is irreducible relative to D(C,Ω). Hence
by Corollary 3.8 B is irreducible relative to D(C ∪C′,Ω). The conclusion
then follows from a further application of Corollary 5.7. 
5.1. Relation to Pearl’s probability of causation. Pearl [18], Chapter 9,
defined the probability of necessity and sufficiency (PNS) of cause X for
outcome D to be P (DX=1(ω) = 1,DX=0(ω) = 0). In other words PNS(D,X)
is the probability that D would occur if X occurred and would not have done
so had X not occurred. We generalize this to the setting in which there are
multiple causes B:
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Definition 5.9. For B⊆ P˙(L(C)), the probability of necessity and suf-
ficiency of B causing D is
PNS(D,B)≡ P (DB=1 = 1 and for all b 6= 1,DB=b = 0).
Thus PNS(D,B) is the probability that D would occur if every literal
L ∈B occurred and would not have done so had at least one literal in B not
occurred.
Proposition 5.10. If |B|= |C|, then PNS(D,B)> 0 if and only if B
is singular for D(C,Ω).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 5.4 and Definition 5.9.

This connection also provides an interpretation for condition (5.6). For
expositional convenience in the following proposition, we assume that B and
D are unconfounded and do not make monotonicity assumptions; it would
be straightforward to do so.
Proposition 5.11. Under the conditions of Corollary 5.6, with W =
∅=B+, PNS(B,D) is bounded below by the right-hand side of (5.6).
Proof.
PNS(D,B) = P (DB=1 = 1 and for all b 6= 1,DB=b = 0)
≥ P (DB=1 = 1) + P (for all b 6= 1,DB=b = 0)− 1
= P (DB=1 = 1)− P (for some b 6= 1,DB=b = 1)
≥ P (DB=1 = 1)−
∑
b6=1
P (DB=b = 1)
= E[D = 1|B= 1]−
∑
b6=1
E[D|B= b]
which is the right-hand side of (5.6) with W=∅=B+. 
This generalizes some of the lower bounds on PNS(D,X) given by Pearl [18],
Section 9.2.
6. Relation to statistical models with linear links. In related work [39] it
is noted that the presence of interaction terms in statistical models do not,
in general, correspond to sufficient conditions for irreducibility. Consider,
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for example, a saturated Bernoulli regression model for D with identity link
and binary regressors C= {X1, . . . ,Xp},
E[D|C= c] =
∑
B˜⊆C
β
B˜
(∧
(B˜)
)
c
.(6.1)
Note that with c= (x1, . . . , xp), then (
∧
(B˜))c =
∏
Xi∈B˜
xi, the usual product
interaction term. The conditions, given earlier, for detecting the presence of
irreducibility and singularity lead to linear restrictions on the regression
coefficients β
B˜
. ∑
B˜⊆C
m
B˜
β
B˜
> 0.(6.2)
Note that (6.2) includes an intercept β∅. First we define
degT(L)≡ |{E|E ∈ T,L ∈E}|,
the degree of L in a tree T, to be the number of edges in T that contain L.
Proposition 6.1. Under the conditions of Theorem 4.11, with B=C,
condition (4.3) is equivalent to restriction (6.2) with m
B˜
=mirred
B˜
where
mirred
B˜
≡ 1− |B \ B˜|+ |T|
(6.3)
−
∑
L∈B˜∩B+
degT(L) + |{E|E ∈ T,E⊆ B˜∩B+}|.
Note that since T is a tree on B+, the last term in (6.3) has a natural
graphical interpretation as the number of edges in the “induced subgraph”
of T on the subset B˜. Definition (6.3) also subsumes condition (4.2) given
in Theorem 4.3 (without monotonicity), in which case the last three terms
in (6.3) vanish. Though Proposition 6.1 assumes that C2 =∅, the condition
given by (6.2) and (6.3) continues to apply in the case where c2 = 0, as
in Corollaries 4.14 and 4.15; obvious extensions apply to the case where
c2 6= 0.
Proof. This follows by counting the number (and sign) of expectations
in (4.3) for which B˜ is a subset of the variables assigned the value 1 in the
conditioning event. The first two terms in (4.3) correspond, respectively, to
the first two terms in (6.3). The remaining three terms in (6.3) correspond
to the last sum in (4.3): |T|, the number of edges in T, is the total num-
ber of terms in the sum. The sum over degrees subtracts the number of
terms in which some L ∈ B˜ is assigned zero. Since this double counts terms
corresponding to edges contained in B˜, the last term corrects for this. 
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Proposition 6.2. Under the conditions of Theorem 5.5, with B =C,
condition (5.3) is equivalent to restriction (6.2) with m
B˜
=msing
B˜
where
msing
B˜
≡mirred
B˜
+ (|B′ \ B˜|)− (2|B
′\B˜| − 1).(6.4)
Proof. Expression (6.4) follows from another counting argument simi-
lar to the proof of Proposition 6.1, together with the observation that con-
ditions (4.3) and (5.3) only differ in that the terms in the sum over L in
(4.3) for L ∈B′ are replaced by a sum over all subsets of B′. 
Example 4 (Two-way interactions). Consider the saturated Bernoulli
regression with identity link with C= {X1,X2}.
E[D|X1 = x1,X2 = x2] = β∅ + β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2.
Suppose that X1 and X2 are unconfounded with respect to D, so (4.1) holds
with W = ∅. Proposition 6.1 implies that {X1,X2} is irreducible relative
to C if β12 > β∅; Proposition 6.2 implies that {X1,X2} is singular relative
to C if β12 > 2β∅. If one of X1 or X2 have positive monotonic effects on D
relative to C, then Proposition 6.1 and Corollary 5.7 imply that {X1,X2}
is both irreducible and singular relative to C if β12 > β∅. If X1 and X2 have
positive monotonic effects on D relative to C, then Proposition 6.1 and
Corollary 5.7 imply that {X1,X2} is both irreducible and singular relative
to C if β12 > 0.
Thus only under the assumption of positive monotonic effects for both
X1 and X2 does the sufficient condition for the irreducibility and singularity
of {X1,X2} coincide with the classical two-way interaction term β12 being
positive. Note that under the assumption of negative monotonic effects of
X1 and X2 on D, β12 < 0 is equivalent to irreducibility and singularity for
D¯ ≡ (1−D); see [36] for this and other remarks on recoding of exposures or
outcomes.
It also follows from Proposition 3.4 that if {X1,X2} is irreducible relative
to C, then there exists some ω ∈Ω for whom {X1,X2} is a minimal sufficient
cause relative to C (since |B|= |C|).
Example 5 (Three-way interactions). The saturated Bernoulli regres-
sion with three binary variables and a identity link can be written as
E[D = 1|X1 = x1,X2 = x2,X3 = x3]
= β∅ + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β12x1x2 + β13x1x3
+ β23x2x3 + β123x1x2x2.
Suppose that C= {X1,X2,X3} is unconfounded for D. Proposition 6.1 im-
plies that {X1,X2,X3} is irreducible relative to C if
β123 > 2β∅ + β1 + β2 + β3.(6.5)
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It follows from Proposition 3.4 that if {X1,X2,X3} is irreducible relative
to C, then there exists some ω ∈ Ω for whom {X1,X2,X3} is a minimal
sufficient cause relative to C (since |B|= |C|).
Proposition 6.2 implies {X1,X2,X3} is singular relative to C if
β123 > 6β∅ +2β1 +2β2 + 2β3.
However, if X1, X2 and X3 have positive monotonic effects on D (relative
to C), then Proposition 6.1 implies {X1,X2,X3} is irreducible relative to C
if any of the following hold:
β123 > β1, β123 > β2, β123 > β3;(6.6)
equivalently, β123 > min{β1, β2, β3}. By Corollary 5.7 this also establishes
that {X1,X2,X3} is singular relative to C.
If only X1 and X2 have positive monotonic effects on D relative to C,
then Proposition 6.1 implies that {X1,X2,X3} is irreducible relative to C if
β123 > β∅ + β1 + β2.(6.7)
By Corollary 5.7, condition (6.7) also implies that {X1,X2,X3} is singular
relative to C (since only X3 does not have a positive monotonic effect on
D). As we would expect condition (6.7) is weaker than (6.5), but stronger
than any of the conditions in (6.6). If only one potential cause has a mono-
tonic effect on D relative to C, then we can only use (6.5) to establish
irreducibility.
Thus for three-way interactions, β123 > 0 does not correspond to any of the
sufficient conditions for irreducibility or singularity of {X1,X2,X3} relative
to C, regardless of whether or not monotonicity assumptions hold.
7. Interpretation of sufficient cause models. As mentioned in Section 2.1
the observed data for an individual (C(ω),D(ω)) represents a strict subset of
the potential outcomes D(C, ω); this is the “fundamental problem of causal
inference.” Further, as we have seen, for a given set of potential outcomes
there can exist different determinative sets of minimal sufficient causes B
for the same set of potential outcomes; see (2.3) and (2.4). Thus we have
the following for an individual:
... ց
... ց
B → D(C, ω) → (C(ω),D(ω)).
... ր
... ր
many-one many-one
(7.1)
It is typically impossible to know the set of potential outcomes for an in-
dividual D(C, ω), even when C= {X}, even from randomized experiments.
However, possession of this knowledge would permit one to predict how a
given individual would respond under any given pattern of exposures C= c.
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The results in this paper demonstrate that, given data from a random-
ized experiment (or when sufficient variables are measured to adjust for
confounding), it is possible to infer the existence of an individual for whom
all sets of minimal sufficient causesB have certain features in common. How-
ever, given the double many-one relationship (7.1), and the fact that the set
of potential outcomes D(C, ω), if they were known, apparently address all
potential counterfactual queries, it is natural to ask what is to be gained by
considering such representations. We now motivate our results by presenting
several different interpretations of sufficient cause representations.
7.1. The descriptive interpretation. Under this view, sets of minimal suf-
ficient causes are merely a way to describe the set of potential outcomes
D(C,Ω). The representation (A,B) may be more compact; compare Ta-
ble 2 and (2.5). Extending this to a population Ω, the variables A in a
representation (A,B) merely describe subpopulations with particular pat-
terns of potential outcomes.
Knowing that there exists an individual for whom all representations B
have certain features in common provides qualitative information about the
set of potential outcomes.
For two binary causes {X1,X2}, Theorem 3.2 implies that {X1,X2} is
irreducible relative to C for ω∗ if D11(ω
∗) = 1 and D10(ω
∗) =D01(ω
∗) = 0.
Such a pattern is of interest insofar as it indicates that the causal process
resulting in this individual’s potential outcomes D(C, ω∗) is such that (for
some setting of the variables in C \ {X1,X2}), D = 1 if both X1 = 1 and
X2 = 1, but not when X1 = 1 and X2 = 0 or vice versa.
Similarly it follows from Theorem 5.2 that if {X1,X2} is singular relative
to C for ω∗ then D11(ω
∗) = 1 and D10(ω
∗) =D01(ω
∗) =D00(ω
∗) = 0. Hence
the causal process producing D(C, ω∗) is such that, for some setting of the
variables in C \ {X1,X2}, D = 1 if both X1 = 1 and X2 = 1, but not when
either X1 = 0 or X2 = 0.
In contrast to the classical notions of interaction arising in linear models
(see Section 6), irreducibility and singularity are causal in that they relate
to the potential outcomes. Sections 4 and 5 contain empirical tests for the
presence of irreducible or singular interactions.
7.2. Generative mechanism interpretations. A minimal sufficient cause
representation may be interpreted in terms of a “generative mechanism”:
Definition 7.1. A mechanism M(ω) relative to C takes as input an
assignment c to C, and outputs a “state” Mc(ω) which is either “active” (1)
or “inactive” (0). A mechanism is said to be generative for D if whenever it
is active, the event D = 1 is caused, so that Mc(ω) = 1 implies Dc(ω) = 1.
Conversely, a mechanism is said to be preventive for D if wheneverMc(ω) =
1, Dc(ω) = 0 is caused.
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Though this definition refers to a mechanism “causing” D = 1 or D = 0,
we abstain from defining this more formally in terms of potential outcomes
until the next section. Our reason for proceeding in this way is that there
may be circumstances in which an investigator is able to posit the existence
of a causal mechanism causing D = 1 or D = 0, for example, based on ex-
periments manipulating the inputs C and output D, but lacks sufficiently
detailed information to posit well-defined counterfactual outcomes involving
interventions on these (hypothesized) mechanisms.
Definition 7.2. A set of generative mechanisms M = 〈M1, . . . ,Mp〉
will be said to be exhaustive for a given set of potential outcomes D(C,Ω)
if for all ω ∈Ω, and all c, if Dc(ω) = 1, then for some M
i ∈M, M ic(ω) = 1.
Note that if M forms an exhaustive set of mechanisms for D(C,Ω), then
it follows that in a context in which no mechanism M i is active, D = 0.
Proposition 7.3. If M= 〈M1, . . . ,Mp〉 forms an exhaustive set of gen-
erative mechanisms for D(C,Ω), then D=
∨
(M) and Dc(ω) =
∨
(Mc(ω)).
Proof. The proof follows from Definitions 7.1 and 7.2. 
Proposition 7.4. Suppose M forms an exhaustive set of generative
mechanisms for D(C,Ω). If B ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B|= |C| and B is irreducible for
D(C;Ω), then there exists an individual ω∗ and a mechanism M i such that
M i
B=1(ω
∗) = 1 but for all L ∈B, M i
B\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗) = 0.
Thus if there exists an exhaustive set of generative mechanisms for D(C,Ω)
and B is irreducible, then there is an individual ω∗ and a mechanism M i
such that M i is active when all the literals in B take the value 1, and is
inactive when any one literal is 0, and the rest continue to take the value 1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, since B is irreducible for D(C;Ω), there exists
ω∗ ∈Ω such that DB=1(ω
∗) = 1 and for all L ∈B, DB\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗). Since
M is an exhaustive set of generative mechanisms for D(C,Ω), we have that
for all c, Dc(ω
∗) =
∨
(Mc(ω)
∗). Since DB=1(ω
∗) = 1, for some Mi ∈M,
M i
B=1(ω
∗) = 1. Since for all L ∈ B, DB\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗) = 0 we have that
M i
B\{L}=1,L=0(ω
∗) = 0. 
Proposition 7.5. Suppose M forms an exhaustive set of generative
mechanisms for D(C,Ω). If B ∈ P˙(L(C)), |B| = |C| and B is singular for
D(C;Ω), then there exists an individual ω∗ and a mechanism M i such that
M i
B=b(ω
∗) = 1 if and only if b= 1.
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Hence under the conditions of Proposition 7.5, if B is singular, then there
is an individual ω∗ and a mechanism M i such that M i is active if and only
if all the literals in B take the value 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 7.4, replacing
Theorem 3.2 by Theorem 5.2. 
As the next example shows, the assumption that there exists an exhaustive
set of generative mechanisms is substantive, and does not hold in all cases.
Example 6. Suppose C= {X1,X2} where X1 and X2 denote the pres-
ence of a variant allele at two particular loci. Let M1 and M2 denote two
different proteins such that M i is produced if and only if Xi = 0, that is,
the associated allele is not present. Finally, let D denote some characteristic
whose occurrence is blocked by the presence of either M1 or M2 (or both).
In this example,
M ix1x2(ω) = (1− xi),
Dx1x2(ω) = (1−M
1
x1x2
)∨ (1−M2x1x2) = x1x2.
By De Morgan’s law, the second equation here may also be expressed as
1−Dx1x2(ω) =M
1
x1x2
(ω)M2x1x2(ω) = 1− x1x2.
The mechanisms M1 and M2 are preventive for D, so that D = 1 only
occurs when both mechanisms are inactive. An exhaustive set of generative
mechanisms does not exist because in this example there are no generative
mechanisms (all mechanisms are preventive).
It is natural to suppose that mechanisms are “modular” and thus may be
isolated or rendered inactive without affecting other such mechanisms. This
may be formalized via potential outcomes:
Definition 7.6. An exhaustive set of generative mechanisms M for
D(C,Ω) are said to support counterfactuals if there exist well-defined po-
tential outcomes DC=c,M=m(ω) and DM=m(ω) such that
DC=c,M=m(ω) =DM=m(ω) =
(∨
(M)
)
m
.
The important assumption here is the existence of the potential outcomes
Dm(ω) and Dc,m(ω). Note that if M supports counterfactuals then inter-
ventions on C do not affect D if interventions are also made on M.
Proposition 7.7. If the exhaustive set of generative mechanisms M
support counterfactuals, then
DM=M(ω)(ω) =DC=C(ω),M=M(ω)(ω) =D(ω)
so that consistency holds for the potential outcomes Dm(ω) and Dc,m(ω).
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Proof. This follows because
DC=C(ω),M=M(ω)(ω) =DM=M(ω)(ω) =
∨
(M(ω)) =D(ω). 
7.3. Counterfactual interpretation of a sufficient cause representation. If
we have an exhaustive set of generative mechanisms which supports counter-
factuals, and further each mechanism is a conjunction of literals, then there
will be a sufficient cause representation that itself supports counterfactuals.
Definition 7.8. A representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω) will be said to be
structural if for each pair (Ai,Bi), Ai∈A, Bi∈B there exists a generative
mechanism (or mechanisms) M i such that M i =Ai ∧ (
∧
(Bi)) and
M iC=c(ω) =Ai(ω)∧
(∧
(Bi)
)
c.
Thus if (A,B) is structural, then each pair (Ai,Bi), Ai∈A, Bi∈B cor-
responds to a mechanism M i. Thus in this case the variables Ai(ω) may
be interpreted as indicating whether the corresponding mechanism(s) M i is
“present” in individual ω. We may thus associate potential outcomes with
the Ai, corresponding to removing (or inserting) the corresponding mech-
anism(s). This interpretation of the Ai’s is consistent with the notion of
“co-cause” which arises in the literature on minimal sufficient causes.
We note that “structural” is often used as a synonym for “causal.” How-
ever, even under the weak interpretation, a sufficient cause representation
is causal in that it represents a set of potential outcomes. The word is used
in Definition 7.8 to connote that the structure of the representation itself
represents (additional) potential outcomes for a set of mechanisms M that
correspond with the pairs (Ai,Bi), Ai∈A, Bi∈B. Note that there need not
be a unique structural representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω). There might be
several functionally equivalent, yet substantively different, generative mech-
anisms corresponding to a given pair (Ai,Bi); see Example 6.
Proposition 7.9. If a representation (A,B) for D(C,Ω), where A=
〈A1, . . . ,Ap〉, is structural, then the associated set of generative mechanisms
〈M1, . . . ,Mp〉 is exhaustive.
Proof. This follows from Definitions 2.7 and 7.2. 
Proposition 7.10. Suppose that M forms an exhaustive set of gen-
erative mechanisms for D(C,Ω), and M supports counterfactuals. If for
all M i ∈M there exists Bi ∈ P˙(L(C)), and an Ai such that for all c, and
ω ∈ Ω, if Ai(ω) = 1, then (M
i)c(ω) =
∧
(Bi)c, then (A= 〈A1, . . . ,Ap〉,B=
〈B1, . . . ,Bp〉) forms a representation for D(C,Ω) that is structural.
Proof. This follows from Definitions 2.7 and 7.8. 
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Proposition 7.11. If there is some representation (A,B) that is struc-
tural, and B ∈ P˙(L(C)) is irreducible for D(C;Ω), then there exists a mech-
anism Mi that is active only if B= 1.
Proof. If B is irreducible for D(C;Ω), then there exists Bi ∈B with
B⊆Bi; the mechanismM
i =Ai∧(
∧
(Bi)) is such thatM
i = 1 only ifB= 1.

Note that the conclusion of Proposition 7.11, unlike those of Proposi-
tions 7.4 and 7.5, does not make reference to an individual ω∗. This is
because Proposition 7.11 assumes that there is a representation (A,B) that
is structural: in this representation the Ai variables may be seen as a con-
stituent part of the corresponding mechanism Mi.
Note that there may exist a set of exhaustive generative mechanisms, but
these mechanisms may not themselves be conjunction of literals so that there
is no sufficient cause representation for D(C;Ω) that is structural:
Example 7. Suppose C= {X1,X2} where X1 and X2 again denote the
presence of variant alleles, acquired by maternal and paternal inheritance,
respectively, at a particular locus. Let M denote a protein that is produced
if and only if either X1 =X2 = 1 or X1 = X2 = 0 and let D denote some
characteristic that occurs if and only if M = 1. Suppose we can intervene to
remove or add the protein. We then have that
Mx1x2(ω) = x1x2 ∨ (1− x1)(1− x2),
Dx1x2(ω) =Mx1x2(ω),
Dx1x2m(ω) =Dm(ω) =m.
Thus {M} constitutes an exhaustive set of generative mechanisms forD(C,Ω).
We have the following representation for D(C,Ω):
Dx1x2(ω) = (A1(ω)X1X2 ∨A2(ω)(1−X1)(1−X2))x1x2
with A1(ω) = A2(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. However, this representation is not
structural because A1(ω)X1X2 and A2(ω)(1 −X1)(1 −X2) do not consti-
tute separate mechanisms for which interventions are conceivable; there is
only one mechanism M , the protein. Since for any ω ∈ Ω, D11(ω) = 1 and
D10(ω) =D01(ω) = 0, {X1,X2} is irreducible relative to C; however it is not
the case that there is a mechanism Mi that is active only if X1X2 = 1 since
for the only mechanism M it is the case that M = 1 if X1 =X2 = 0. Note,
however, in this example there is still a mechanism, namely M , that will
be “active” if X1 =X2 = 1 but will be “inactive” if only one of X1 or X2
is 1.
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Example 8. To illustrate the results in the paper we consider again the
data presented in Table 1. We let D denote bladder cancer, X1 smoking,
X2 the S NAT2 genotype and X3 the *10 allele on NAT1. As discussed in
Example 5, if the effect of C= {X1,X2,X3} is unconfounded for D and we
fit the model
E[D = 1|X1 = x1,X2 = x2,X3 = x3]
= β∅ + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β12x1x2(7.2)
+ β13x1x3 + β23x2x3 + β123x1x2x2,
then if X1, X2 and X3 have positive monotonic effects on D (relative to C),
then {X1,X2,X3} is irreducible relative to C if any of the following hold:
β123 > β1, β123 > β2, β123 > β3.
We cannot fit model (7.2) directly with case control data. However, under
the assumption that the outcome is rare (reasonable with bladder cancer)
so that odds ratios approximate risk ratios, we can fit the model
E[D = 1|X1 = x1,X2 = x2,X3 = x3]/E[D = 1|X1 = 0,X2 = 0,X3 = 0]
(7.3)
= θ1x1 + θ2x2 + θ3x3 + θ12x1x2 + θ13x1x3 + θ23x2x3 + θ123x1x2x2,
and the conditions for the irreducibility of {X1,X2,X3} relative to C under
monotonicity of {X1,X2,X3} become
θ123 > θ1, θ123 > θ2, θ123 > θ3.
If we fit model (7.3) using maximum likelihood, we find that
θ123 − θ1 = 1.21 (95% CI:− 3.83,6.26),
θ123 − θ2 = 2.93 (95% CI:− 2.85,8.72),
θ123 − θ3 = 2.97 (95%CI:− 2.80,8.74).
In each case, under our assumption of no confounding, the point estimate
suggests evidence of irreducibility, under monotonicity of {X1,X2,X3}, but
the sample size is not sufficiently large to draw this conclusion confidently.
With monotonicity of {X1,X2,X3}, irreducibility also implies a singular
interaction for {X1,X2,X3}. If we assume that only {X1,X2} or {X1,X3} or
{X2,X3} are monotonic relative to C, then the conditions for irreducibility
in Example 5 can be expressed, respectively, as
θ123 > 1 + θ1+ θ2, θ123 > 1 + θ1 + θ3, θ123 > 1 + θ2 + θ3.
From model (7.3) we have that
θ123 − (1 + θ1 + θ2) = 0.09 (95% CI:− 4.77,4.96),
θ123 − (1 + θ1 + θ3) = 0.13 (95% CI:− 4.69,4.95),
θ123 − (1 + θ2 + θ3) = 1.86 (95% CI:− 3.41,7.12).
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Again, under our assumption of no confounding, in each case the point
estimate suggests evidence of irreducibility, under monotonicity of just two
of the three exposures, but the sample size is not sufficiently large to draw
this conclusion confidently. With monotonicity of two of the three exposures,
irreducibility also implies a singular interaction for {X1,X2,X3}. The test
for irreducibility in Example 5 without assumptions about monotonicity can
be expressed as
θ123 > 2 + θ1 + θ2 + θ3.
From model (7.3) we have that
θ123 − (2 + θ1 + θ2 + θ3) =−0.99 (95% CI:− 5.86,3.88).
In this case, not even the point estimate is positive.
If {X1,X2,X3} is in fact irreducible and if there exists a representation
that is structural, then it follows by Proposition 7.11 that there exists a
mechanism that is active only if X1 = 1,X2 = 1,X3 = 1.
8. Concluding remarks. In this paper we have developed general results
for notions of interaction that we referred to as “irreducibility” (aka “a
sufficient cause interaction”) and “singularity” (aka “a singular interaction”)
for sufficient cause models with an arbitrary number of dichotomous causes.
The theory could be extended by developing notions of sufficient cause,
irreducibility and singularity for causes and outcomes that are categorical
and/or ordinal in nature; see [34].
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